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Introduction
Since the introduction of powerful harvesting technologies and the growth in demand for fish as a food source, unregulated fish stocks are prone to over exploitation and collapse. Gametheory has provided reasons for anticipating this outcome if a fish stock remains as a common property resource.
A minimal level of regulation to prevent stock collapse is to impose total allowable catches (TACs) that are likely to ensure that stock biomass remains high enough to prevent collapse.
Bioeconomic models have been used to estimate the TACs necessary to maximise the present value of future rents from a fish stock. These TACs are typically much more stringent, and hence more unpalatable to operators in the industry in the short term. Perhaps because of this, to date no regulator has adopted rent maximisation for setting TACs. Alternatively, it may be that the goals of government are more weighted towards maintenance of fishing activity in the short-run, or towards community and employment considerations, than on economic efficiency.
It was expected that the introduction of the Law of the Sea and the recognition of nations' rights to declare exclusive economic zones (EEZs) would allow governments to set TACs to maximise rents if they so desired, because they would be able to control access to the EEZs.
As discussed by Bjørndal (2001) , Munro (2001) , and Bjørndal and Munro (forthcoming) , it was subsequently realised that this did not necessarily provide the conditions for rent 1 This project was undertaken whilst the author was on study leave from the Department of Economics and Finance at La Trobe University in Melbourne. The author is grateful to the Norwegian Research Council and the Norwegian School of Economics and Administration (NHH) in Bergen for making this project feasible, and to Røgnvaldur Hannesson for facilitating its progress. Without any adverse implications, thanks are due to Røgnvaldur Hannesson, Trond Bjørndal, the Centre for Fisheries Economics at NHH, Dankert Skagen, Svein Iversen, Sigmund Engesaeter and Jarle Hansen for useful discussion and comments. Biological and catch data published by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea is acknowledged as a major data source. maximisation if a fish stock in one EEZ also straddled the EEZ of another nation, or of international waters.
The scope for strategic interaction between nations has led to further game-theoretic analysis of the conditions suitable for rent maximisation, and applications of the analysis to many different fisheries. The practical relevance of this wider multinational analysis still depends on the extent to which rent maximisation is seen as a goal of government, and if it is, most importantly, the plausibility of the predicted gains and losses accruing to the nations involved from alternative cooperative arrangements.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the scope for multinational cooperation in setting national TACs for EEZs and a TAC for international waters so as to maximise rents for the North-East Atlantic mackerel fishery. The stock is harvested by some coastal nations that have mackerel in their EEZs at different times of the year, and by others that can otherwise harvest mackerel in international waters. Comparisons are made between current harvesting and stock levels, and levels under cooperative rent maximisation, and non-cooperative rent maximisation.
Similar work on multinational gaming has been conducted for Norwegian spring-spawning herring, another pelagic stock that shares some of the same feeding grounds, and is harvested by an overlapping group of nations (Lindroos 2000; Arnason et al. 2001; and Lindroos and Kaitala 2001) . The extension of the analysis to multinational exploitation of multispecies stocks is an obvious future but more complex project.
The North-East Atlantic mackerel stock
North-East Atlantic mackerel consists of three separate stocks, referred to as the North Sea, Western and Southern components, based on different spawning grounds (ICES 2000) . For management purposes they are treated as one stock, because the stocks mix at times when they are jointly harvested. The Western component is by far the largest, accounting for 71 to 86 per cent of the stock (ICES 2001) . The North Sea stock is currently heavily depleted.
North-East Atlantic mackerel is a straddling stock, subject to harvesting at different times of the year by the countries whose fishing zones they pass through. The major coastal-state harvesters of North-East Atlantic mackerel are Norway, Scotland and Ireland. In quarter 1 shoals migrate from the Northern North Sea to the area off the North West coast of Scotland, when the stock is heavily fished by Scotland and Ireland. After spawning in quarter 2, primarily off the West coast of Scotland and in the Irish Sea, much of the catch in quarter 3 is taken by Russia and Norway in the Norwegian and Northern North Seas. Russia's catch is mainly in the international waters, variously referred to as the Ocean Loop, the Banana Loop, and the Herring Loophole. In quarter 4 Norway continues to take a significant catch in the Northern North Sea.
ICES makes recommendations on annual TACs for North-East Atlantic mackerel by fishing area, on criteria of biological sustainability. The coastal players conduct negotiations to agree the distribution of the TACs that are set after taking account of the ICES recommendations.
The distributions tend to be based on recent catch levels, a policy that sometimes leads to inefficient catch behaviour and mis-reporting. The North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) plays the role of a regional fisheries management organization in obtaining agreement between the coastal and non-coastal players on the distribution of the quota set for the catch in international waters. For example, NEAFC has arranged agreement on allocation of the international waters' quota of 65,000 tonnes for 2001 between the Russian federation (38,000 t), Denmark (on behalf of the Faroes and Greenland), the EU and Norway (22,000 t), Iceland (2,500 t), and Poland (1,000 t).
Catch history over the last ten years is shown in Figure 1 . Catches have fluctuated, averaging about 400 thousand tonnes per year, with the EU and Norway taking similar amounts. A model is formulated in the next section that characterises the harvesting of North-East Atlantic mackerel as determined by the three major harvesters with alternative cooperative behaviour, outside the actual institutional arrangements for management. The aim is to identify the maximum rents to harvesters under alternative cooperative and non-cooperative coalition arrangements from harvests over the first 20 years of a 30-year planning horizon.
Harvesting profiles and present values for alternative coalition arrangements over time can be compared with current levels, and some deductions made on harvester goals and incentives for cooperative arrangements.
The Model
The formulation and structure of the model is developed in this section. A flow chart summarising seasonal cohort flow, fishing mortality, and harvesting, is presented in Appendix Figure A1 .
Players
The major harvesters of North-East Atlantic mackerel, Russia and Norway, and the EU members, Scotland and Ireland (designated EU henceforth) are indexed by j = 1 to 3 respectively.
Fishing seasons and areas
The model is run for a finite time horizon of Y years, starting with year 1 as the base year, 2000. Track is kept of harvesting, spawning and marketing by season of the year ( 1,..., 4) s = , corresponding to calendar quarters ( 3, 4,1, 2) q = . All harvesting occurs in seasons 1 to 3.
Spawning takes place in season 4 (quarter 2). Although in reality harvesting does occur in season 4, it is relatively low at about 10 per cent of annual harvest, and is ignored in the modelling. In recent years about 30 per cent of the total catch has been taken in each of the seasons 1 to 3 (ICES 2000, pp. 32-33 
As an approximation it is assumed that all parameters specific to age-12 mackerel, such as weight and selectivity coefficients, also apply to older mackerel. The second component of the RHS of (6) is shown in Figure A1 by the broken link arrow between box 12, ,4 y x and box 12, 1,1 y x + .
Harvests
Assuming fishing mortality is applied at a constant rate throughout each season, the total of instantaneous harvests ('000 tonnes) for the j-th player is: 
where , , j a s wc is the average weight of mackerel (kg) caught by harvester j at age a in season s.
Net revenue
Player j's net revenue from harvesting in year y is defined as: 
where r is the annual rate of discount.
Total Revenue from harvesting
The price of mackerel has been relatively buoyant over the last five years, due mainly to strong demand from Japan, driven by reductions in the Japanese catch of chub mackerel.
Most mackerel is now sold for human consumption. Norway has emerged as the major supplier to the Japanese market. Other major markets for mackerel are Eastern Europe, Russia, and Nigeria (see Asche and Aarland 2000; Asche, Bjørndal, and Hole 1998; Hannesson 2000; Hempel 2000; and Nakamoto 2000) .
Factors affecting the price each harvester receives are the total harvest of all harvesters, the season of the catch, the average weight of the fish, and demand in the final markets. These factors are considered in this section and quantified for modelling the revenue generated for each of the three harvesters in the model. All mackerel prices are given in Norwegian Kroner, adjusted to 1999 base-year prices using the Norwegian CPI (Statistics Norway 2000).
Mackerel prices given in US and UK currency have been converted using exchange rates Higher Japanese prices can be explained by Japanese consumers demanding higher quality mackerel in characteristics such as size and oil content. Temporary shortages may also be a factor. Japanese demand for imported mackerel has grown as a result of reduced domestic catches following over harvesting. and were much higher in 1996 and 1997. Hempel (2000) refers to EU mackerel exports losing market share in Japan, Russia and Asia, while gaining in Africa in 1998. It needs to be pointed out though that the FAO data must allow for a large component of Norwegian exports being re-exports because recorded exports exceed production. Hannesson (2000) points out that in 1989 and 1999 imports were 80 per cent of the Norwegian catch.
Norwegian export and import prices by country, and by weight category (above or below 600 g), are given in Figure 3 , for years since 1992 for which data have been published. Panels (a) and (b) show Norway received higher prices from Japan than from Russia and Poland within each weight category, and higher prices for the heavier fish, particularly from Japan in 1996.
Norway's exports to Japan accounted for about 50 per cent by weight of Norwegian exports , 1991-1999 Source: FAO (2001) In the modelling, the relativity of prices between the three harvesters is fixed. For the three years 1997 to 1999, the average export price received by Norway was 1.19 relative to the weighted average export price for Norway and the EU combined of 1.00 (FAO, 2001 1.00 ψ = is taken for determining the Russian price. Russia, as primarily an importer of mackerel, is not selling on high-price markets, but its market value is likely to be high given that it is predominantly harvesting in a high-price season.
Over the nineties there was a strong negative correlation between price and harvest. A good fit was obtained for a linear regression of Norway and EU weighted export price on production of Russia, Norway and the EU over the years 1991 to 1999. The results are presented in Table 2 , and show significant intercept and slope coefficients. (2001) The equation was used as the mackerel inverse demand schedule in the model as follows:
where y P is the weighted export price of export mackerel from Norway and EU in NOK 1999 per kg, and y H is the total catch in thousand tonnes: 
with a ws the weight at age in the stock in the base year.
Harvest function (14) allows for harvest to be directly proportional to both harvesting effort and stock biomass for both exponents equal to one. The stock exponent 1 γ = is reasonable if the stock is uniformly distributed in the sea. However, if a stock, such as mackerel, schools and can be subjected to directed fishing, a fall in stock biomass is likely to lead to a less than proportionate fall in harvest, implying 1 γ < .
An effort exponent 1 φ < arises if additional harvesting requires greater than proportionate additional days at sea, or if there is asymmetry in the cost of harvesting for changes in effort due to the irreversibility of capital investment in vessels. For example, an increase in effort may incur a cost for increases in vessel capacity, as well as direct costs. An equivalent reduction in effort may not save the same vessel capacity cost if the opportunity cost of use of vessels is zero.
From Eq (14) effort , , j y s e as a function of harvest , , 
which makes j's total cost of catch effort in each season s : 
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The value of the cost coefficient for the j-th harvester is set at the level which ensures that for base-year harvest j h and base-year price j p ψ in 1999, total cost is the estimated base-year proportion of total revenue, , j s θ , or:
where w is the estimated base-year stock biomass.
In the model, values of θ for Norway are taken to be 0.83, based on operating expenses as a proportion of operating revenues for all vessel sizes fishing pelagic species in 1998 and 1999
(Directorate of Fisheries 2001, Tables H4 and H5 ). For lack of similar data available for the other harvesting nations, the same values were adopted for these nations also. This is likely to be a reasonable assumption for UK and Irish vessels that use similar types of vessel and gear, but there is less certainty about the applicability of the assumption for Russia.
The stock and effort exponents in the Schaefer harvest function (14) total cost is plotted in Figure 5 for values of φ equal to 1.0, 0.8 and 0.6, for the case of Russia. All three schedules pass through the same point for the base year harvest 1 h = 51,000 tonnes. In model runs φ is set at 0.8 and 0.6 to cover a range of convexity from slight to strong. 
Modelling alternative coalition behaviour
The behaviour of the grand coalition is modelled as a straightforward maximisation problem.
In the case of other coalition arrangements, the strategic interaction of two or more players results in non-cooperative dynamic Nash equilibria.
Cooperative joint maximisation of net revenues
Russia, Norway and the EU set fishing mortalities for each year of the planning horizon of Y years so as to maximise the present value of combined net revenue over the planning horizon.
The problem is: 
The outcome must be Pareto optimal because by maximising joint benefits it is impossible for any player to increase their benefit by changing their fishing plan without loss to another player. It is the outcome achieved by the grand coalition of players. However, in practice for various reasons harvesting nations do not combine to obtain the efficient outcome. Whilst the harvesting countries may view total returns as measurable in currency, and hence transferable, they may not be wholly financial flows, as for example if consumer surplus were recognised as a return. This may make sharing of the total benefit more difficult. Another problem that inhibits joint maximisation is lack of knowledge of the counterfactual. The grand coalition is formed presumably with each country supposing they will achieve a share of joint returns that will make them better off than if they go it alone, but if they join, how do they know what they would have gained otherwise?
Non-cooperative maximisation of coalition net revenues
In the case of three players, there are three possible coalition subgroups of two members (denoted RN_E, NE_R and RE_N, where R, N, E stand for Russia, Norway and EU, and the break point separates the coalition groups). There remains the possibility that all players are non-aligned (denoted R_N_E), representing three coalitions of one member. This makes four possible coalition groupings outside the grand coalition.
It may be rational for a coalition to form if the coalition can take actions to maximise returns for its members, subject to all other coalitions similarly taking actions to maximise returns for their members. For each coalition grouping, denoting each coalition in turn by n, and the remaining coalitions by n , the coalition n faces the problem: 
Results
Results for all country alignments are given initially for the base parameter settings detailed in Appendix Tables A1 and A2 , with the stock exponent 1 γ = and effort exponent 0.8 φ = .
The planning horizon Y is set at 30, though all net present values and harvest profiles are given for the first 20 years of the planning horizon. This is to avoid any significant divergence of results for years approaching the planning horizon from those for an infinite planning horizon, due to the incentive to draw down stock with zero terminal value. In practice, the draw-down effect on the approach to year 30 is very minor for the model parameter settings (see Appendix A3). All net present values (NPVs) are present values of net returns over years 1 to 20, in millions of NOK for the base year 1999.
The NPV of returns for all five coalitions are given in Table 3 , and displayed in Figure 6 .
NPVs under joint maximisation (RNE) are much greater for Norway (15,893) than those for Russia (2,234) and the EU (692). Norway's NPV reduces substantially under all four coalition groupings, though still remains the highest of the three. Norway's NPV is lowest under the single-member coalitions, the non-cooperative outcome, at 6,574. The EU's NPV under non-cooperation compared to under joint maximisation is relatively high at 3,972. For Russia it is 3,148. Norway, S2
Norway, S1
Russia, S1
The proportion of total harvest contributed by each harvester is quite different. Under joint maximisation, Norway is the predominant contributor. The EU contribution in year 1 is very small at about 11 per cent, compared to the actual 1999 contribution of 46 per cent, and declines markedly. Under non-cooperation the contribution starts at 36 per cent and remains fairly stable. Thus it appears that non-cooperation mimics current harvesting behaviour more closely than does joint maximisation (compare modelled catches in panels a and b with recent catches in Figure 1 ).
Turning to incentives for the formation of coalitions, the 3-dimensional harvester NPVs of Table 3 are represented in Figure 6 in Norway NPV and EU NPV space, with one-for-one NOK trade-off lines through each coalition outcome. The NPV for Russia is given at each coalition outcome point. It is clear that without transfers or side-payments, no coalition (including the grand coalition) dominates any other. Regarding total NPVs for coalition combinations, between the joint maximisation in the grand coalition (RNE -18,819) and the non cooperative outcome (R_N_E -13,694), the three two-member coalitions are bunched around a NPV of about 9,000 for Norway and a total NPV of about 16,000, with inversely related NPV's for Russia and the EU. For all three of these coalitions, the other singlemember always gains higher NPVs than when they are in coalition.
The only coalition grouping which cannot be blocked, or is in the core, is the non-cooperative three single-member grouping. The EU's NPV in the non-cooperative grouping is their second highest out of all of the coalition groupings. Norway's is the lowest.
If monetary transfers are possible, transfers can be engineered under the grand coalition which make it the only member of the core, or which cannot be blocked by any other coalition. It transpires that one such transfer arrangement is that which gives each harvester their Shapley value. The Shapley value for each harvester is the weighted sum of the contributions the harvester makes to each possible coalition (Dixit and Skeath 1999) . The contribution a harvester makes to a coalition is the total payoff to the coalition less the total payoff to the coalition excluding the harvester. Contributions are shown in Table 4 based on the harvester NPVs for each coalition shown in Table 3 . For example, Russia's contribution of 7,906 to the grand coalition is calculated as the joint return of 18,819, less the payoff of (9,669 + 1,244 = 10,913) to the Norway and the EU in the NE_R grouping. Russia's contribution of 3,360 to the RN coalition is calculated as the joint return of (1,631 + 8,303 = 9,934), less the payoff of 6,574 to the Norway on its own. Russia's contribution to the R coalition, compared to not being a participant, is its non-cooperative payoff of 3,148.
In the three-harvester case, the weights on a harvester's contributions to each of the coalitions they could belong to are 1/3 for the grand coalition, 1/6 for each of the two two-member coalition groupings, and 1/3 for the non-cooperative grouping. These are based on each size of coalition to which the harvester could belong being equally likely, namely 1/3 for each of the coalition sizes of 3, 2 and 1.
The resulting Shapley value for each harvester is shown in the bottom line of Table 4 , and again in Table 5 (run 1) together with the transfers required. Norway transfers 2,533 to Russia and 4,977 to the EU. Although this does not have to be the case, from the NPVs in Table 4 it can be checked that the Shapley values do belong to the core. Norway pays the larger sum to the other harvester with the greatest incentive to otherwise ensure a noncooperative outcome.
Thus redistributing the total return from the most efficient outcome under the grand coalition so that each harvester receives their Shapley value is one redistribution that would forestall the otherwise most inefficient outcome of non-cooperation. Compared with other redistributions that could also achieve this, the Shapley redistribution is seen as desirable in incorporating an incentive for efficiency (Shapley values are proportional to contributions), and fair in the sense that all sizes of alternative coalitions are weighted as equally likely.
These are both characteristics that make adoption of Shapley transfers more likely. However, probably the most important factor determining their acceptance and adoption would be the credibility of the modelled NPV outcomes for the different coalitions. As some check on this, the sensitivity of the qualitative results to uncertain parameter values is considered.
Sensitivity analysis
Parameters which have not been empirically estimated for this study are the stock and effort exponents in the Schaeffer harvesting equation (14), γ and φ . Bjørndal (1989) Table 5 . Table 5 shows that for all of the parameter sets tested, Norway makes transfers to Russia and the EU, with the transfer to the EU about double that to Russia. The incentives for coalition formation are the same for solutions in runs 2 to 6 as they are for run 1. If monetary transfers are not feasible, the non-cooperation solution is in the core, and no other. If monetary transfers are feasible, joint maximisation solutions with Shapley value transfers are in the core. Reducing the effort exponent φ from 0.8 to 0.6 for γ =1.0 (runs 1 and 2), and for γ =0.6
(runs 3 and 4), markedly reduces the transfers required to achieve the Shapley values for each player. The transfer to Russia is reduced to roughly a third, and to the EU to roughly a half, of that for φ = 0.8. The Shapley values change also, but by a much lower order of magnitude.
The result can be explained by the reduction in φ lowering the inequality of returns to the players under joint maximisation. Harvests and returns increase for Russia, and even more substantially for the EU, at Norway's expense. The increased convexity of the total harvest cost schedule resulting from reducing φ from 0.8 to 0.6 has already been shown in Figure 5 .
The increased convexity reduces the extent to which Norway can exploit its price advantage on overseas markets.
The transfers required to achieve the Shapley values are also reduced as the stock exponent γ is reduced from 1.0 to 0.6 to 0.0 for 0.8 φ = in runs 1, 3 and 5, but to a lower extent. The effect of a reduction in γ on harvest profiles across years is to reduce the incentive to initially harvest at a low level to obtain a cost advantage from higher stocks later. For γ = 0, the year-1 harvest for the EU under joint maximisation is double the harvest for γ = 1.0. Harvests are virtually unchanged from year 1 to year 30. Year-30 stocks are higher, indicating that whilst it is optimal to harvest earlier at a higher level, over all years it is optimal to harvest less intensively.
Quotas on mackerel harvesting are higher than would be economically efficient. To the extent that the industry is able to influence quota setting, this may indicate that the industry is more likely to take a shorter-term view of benefits accruing from fishing. The real discount rate may be higher than market rates. In run 6 the stock and effort exponents are as for run 1, but the rate of discount is increased from 5 to 10 per cent per annum. The time profiles of harvests are only marginally increased, and there is no change in coalition incentives.
An important question is what planning horizon should be used in the analysis. As there is no non-arbitrary horizon, an infinite horizon is perhaps appropriate. All modelled NPVs have been given for the first 20 years of a 30-year planning horizon. Both the 20 and the 30-year time spans are arbitrary, but in appendix A3 it is shown that the NPVs for the first 20 years in the optimal solution to the problem with an infinite planning horizon would be very little different. Consequently, the coalition incentive systems would not change.
The main result is that for a wide range of parameter values, the grand coalition is unstable if there is no redistribution of the joint maximisation NPV profile. Without transfers the outcome is the type of non-cooperative fishing currently observed. However, there is scope for achieving the efficiency gains of joint maximisation by suitable transfer of the joint benefits, such as that given by the Shapley values.
Discussion and Conclusions
Perhaps not so surprisingly, joint maximisation policies show optimal harvest levels to be about half current levels, and significant growth in stocks. Kennedy (1992) found that the optimal long-run level of fishing effort directed at western mackerel in 1989 would be one half to one third of actual effort. However, under non-cooperation (single-member coalitions only), the Nash equilibrium harvests are still much lower than the TACs currently set. This reflects the prevailing practice of setting TACs as high as possible, whilst avoiding any likelihood of stock collapse under the precautionary principle.
Various issues arise. How important are the rents generated from mackerel stocks, to the industry and to government? Should the harvesting nations or nation groups negotiate between themselves to set the TAC in a rent generation framework rather than a biological sustainability framework? Alternatively, if some other goal besides rent maximisation has a higher ranking in the social objective function, such as maximisation of labour employed in the industry, there is no reason why gaming analysis should not be conducted with that goal.
Even if economic efficiency were seen as an important social goal, there would be no guarantee that this would be achieved under agreement between all harvesters to harvest through time so as to maximise joint producer rents. It may be that total social rent is regarded as including consumer surplus as well as producer surplus. If the catch is exported, lower prices benefit foreign and not domestic consumers, and normal practice in cost-benefit analysis is to accord such benefits zero weighting. However, in this application, one of the harvesting nations is a net importer, namely Russia, so there is an argument for including Russian consumer surplus in the objective functions of coalitions.
The current system of agreeing the allocation of the TAC is quite different from that modelled in the gaming scenarios. In current negotiations for allocation of both coastal state and international waters TACs, shares tend to be worked out on the basis of recent harvest activity, or claims of relative proportions of stock in EEZs. The system to some extent gives the impression of fairness, or at least the system does lead to agreed outcomes. However, as already mentioned, the system is not immune from strategic manipulation, with possibly undesirable social outcomes. Moving to a system of negotiating with specific goals such as rent maximisation might lead to more desirable social outcomes, but agreement may be more difficult to achieve. Restricting the number of players to three is another simplification. This leads to the overestimation of returns compared to modelling more players if the excluded smaller players are less efficient than the main three. Also, harvesting by the three main players is likely to be greater in the short run in the knowledge that they face competition for access to stocks from other players.
A third caveat is the absence of any density dependence in the biological modelling. Even for non-cooperative harvesting solutions, modelled stock levels rise after 30 years to levels about 40 per cent higher than current stocks. No allowance is made for possible changes in agedependent natural mortality or in recruitment at these stock levels.
An interesting extension of the modelling would be the introduction of Japan as a fourth player. Japan's decisions on the TAC setting on stocks of chub mackerel within their EEZ (Yatsu et al. 2001; and Hernandez and Ortega 2000) , and restrictions on imports of NorthEast Atlantic mackerel, interact strategically with the harvesting decisions by European nations through marketing and price effects. Japan's objective function might be the present value of net revenue from harvesting mackerel, plus consumer surplus accruing to Japanese consumers of mackerel. There is also an interaction on the production side to the extent that Russia is a major harvester of chub mackerel in the Sea of Japan. Table 3 .2.1.2.1. Data for Western mackerel rather than for North-East Atlantic mackerel as a whole are used for modelling the "Northern" stock because of the predominance of the western stock. ICES (2000) uses relative weights for calculating stock weights for North Sea, Western and Southern mackerel components of 0.02, 0.73 and 0.25 respectively. Constraint (3) ensures that the net return from harvesting in year T, T NR , could be sustained or bettered in all subsequent years in perpetuity. The second term in (2) is the present value of receiving T NR in perpetuity, and is a lower limit of the value of year T stocks across all age categories. Adding the second term presents an incentive to increase year T -1 stocks so long as the present value of harvesting thereby foregone is more than offset by the present value of the perpetuity.
The value of (2) is less than the value obtained from pursuing an optimal harvesting strategy in perpetuity to the extent that (3) holds as an inequality. The greater T, the closer the solution for year T-1 is to the steady state solution, and the closer will be the two sides of inequality (3). T needs to be at least larger than the number of age groups to ensure that constraint (3) can be satisfied for any opening stock numbers by age group.
The solutions shown in Table A3 to the mackerel problem of maximising the NPV of joint rents using finite planning horizons of 20, 30, 60 and 100 years, and to the problems of maximising approximately the NPV of rents over an infinite planning horizon with the same number of decision stages, can be compared.
All the indications are that the solution to the 100 inf problem is very close to the solution for the first 100 years of the infinite planning horizon problem. The across-cohort fishing mortality values 1, ,1 2, ,1 2, ,2 3, ,3 , , , The solution to the 100 fin problem is similar for years 27 to 93. Stock drawdown occurs from year 94 to year 100, effected through increases in 3, ,3 y f . The optimal year-100 acrosscohort fishing mortalities for the 100 fin problem are 0.12, 0.32, 0.66, 0.19. Two main conclusions follow from Table A3 . Firstly, the results over the first 20 years of the solution to the 30-year planning horizon problem (as reported in the main body of the paper) can reasonably be taken to be the results for the first 20 years of an infinite planning horizon for this problem. The values of SSB20 and NPV20 for the 30 fin problem are little different from those for the longer planning horizon problems, and in particular, from those for the 100 inf problem.
Second, the inf problem with objective function (2) and constraint (3) gives fishing mortalities for the last stage which are very close to the optimal steady state fishing mortalities for this problem with 30 or more decision stages. As expected, the fin problems show stock drawdown effects, with lower SSB and higher NPV for the final decision stage. This suggests that the inf problem formulation is a simple and efficient means of obtaining a good approximation to the solution to the infinite planning horizon problem, using mathematical programming with a finite number of decision stages.
